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Abstract 
We investigate whether volunteering has a causal effect on 
individual employment opportunities. To this end, a field 
experiment is conducted in which volunteering activities are 
randomly assigned to fictitious job applications sent to genuine 
vacancies in Belgium. We find that volunteers are 7.3 percentage 
points more likely to get a positive reaction to their job 
applications. The volunteering premium is higher for females but 
invariant with respect to the number of engagements. 
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1. Introduction 
Volunteering is a widespread phenomenon in OECD countries. On average, 23.4% of 
respondents in the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS6) in 2012/2013 
reported that they were involved in work for voluntary or charitable organisations 
at least once every six months. As seen in Figure 1, statistics on volunteering in 
Europe are both stable over time and heterogeneous across countries. Whereas in 
2012/2013 in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, more than 40% 
of ESS6 respondents volunteered, in Bulgaria and Hungary, less than 10% engaged 
at least once every sixth months in volunteer work. Given the substantial amount of 
engagement as a volunteer, economists have unsurprisingly shown a renewed 
interest over the past decade in the economic consequences of these types of 
activities, from both society’s and individuals’ point of view (see, e.g., Binder and 
Freytag, 2013; Carpenter and Myers, 2010; Cozzi et al., in press; Meier and Stutzer, 
2008; Sauer, 2015). In the present study, we focus on the causal effect of 
volunteering with respect to individuals’ (paid) employment opportunities. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
Theoretically, there are three likely channels through which volunteering might 
affect one’s labour market outcomes: human capital, social capital and employer 
preferences. Based on these channels, both beneficial and adverse effects of 
volunteering on employment outcomes are possible. First, volunteer work may 
directly enhance individuals’ human capital by providing them with an alternative 
way to acquire skills and experience. Following standard Human Capital Theory 
(Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1958), these skills and experience may lead to additional 
returns on the labour market (Becker, 1964; Day and Devlin, 1997; Day and Devlin, 
1998). However, based on the same theory in combination with the Theory of the 
Allocation of Time (Becker, 1965), a negative effect might also be expected because 
maintaining substantial volunteering schemes may interfere with time investments 
in hard skills. Second, according to Social Network Theory (Granovetter, 1973), 
during volunteer work, socially engaged people may expand their networks, which 
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might help them find a better job match more quickly (Sauer, 2015). Thirdly and 
finally, volunteering might affect employers’ hiring and promotion decisions even 
when volunteering activities do not affect employees’ human or social capital. On 
the one hand, following Becker’s (1957) taste-based discrimination model, 
employers may prefer (not) to hire job candidates with volunteering activities just 
because these employers, their co-workers or customers experience a certain 
(dis)utility from working together with these prosocially engaged people. On the 
other hand, following Arrow’s (1973) model of statistical discrimination, employers 
might use social engagement on applicants’ résumés to screen and sort job seekers 
according to abilities that are unobserved by these employers. In this respect, social 
engagement is related in the peer-reviewed literature to personality traits such as 
emotional stability, extraversion and openness, which are shown to enhance 
individual productivity and team performance (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Bekkers, 
2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Borghans et al., 2008; Costa and McCrae, 1992; 
Elshaug and Metzer, 2001; Gregg et al. 2011; Fortin, 2008; Heineck, 2011; Lagarde 
and Blaauw, 2014; OECD, 2015; Tett et al., 1991; Uysal and Pohlmeier, 2011). 
However, volunteering might also be perceived as a signal of a lower focus on regular 
employment given the aforementioned time trade-off between volunteering 
activities and regular work. 
We are aware of seven previous studies by economists that confronted the 
aforementioned theoretical expectations with the empirical reality: Day and Devlin 
(1997), Day and Devlin (1998), Prouteau and Wolff (2006), Hackl et al. (2007), Sauer 
(2015), Wilson et al. (2017) and Cozzi et al. (in press). Table 1 summarises the 
research results published, between 1997 and 2017, either as a journal article or as 
a working paper. As shown in Table 1, these studies were conducted based on 
observational data for Austria, Canada (two studies), France, the United Kingdom 
(two studies) and the United States. Most of them apply micro-econometric 
techniques, which are described in the last column of Table 1, to control for 
unobserved determinants of both volunteering and labour market outcomes. 
Remarkably, all these studies found statistically significantly positive effects of 
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volunteer work on income.1 However, this premium varied considerably, i.e. from 
2.6% to 94.7%. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
In the present study, we complement this empirical evidence by measuring the 
premium of volunteering with respect to an alternative labour market outcome, i.e. 
employment opportunities. Thereby, we explore a potential reason for the positive 
association between volunteering and income reported in the literature, i.e. the 
access to a (potentially better paid) job. To this end, we provide the first (field) 
experimental estimates on the labour market returns to volunteering. More 
concretely, we run a randomised field experiment in which pairs of fictitious job 
applications are sent to real vacancies. For each vacancy, one of the two applications 
is randomly assigned to a treatment of volunteering. Due to this experimental 
design, selection into volunteering on the basis of individual unobservable 
characteristics is eliminated because the researcher controls all the information 
received by the employer. Therefore, unequal treatment of volunteers and non-
volunteers can be due only to their revealed social engagement.  
Moreover, our research design enables us to provide suggestive evidence with 
respect to heterogeneous treatment effects of volunteering. First, we inspect 
whether the returns to volunteering in hiring are heterogeneous by gender. Former 
empirical evidence on gender differentials indicates higher premiums for males. Day 
and Devlin (1997), Wilson et al. (2017) and Cozzi et al. (in press) found that men have 
larger returns to volunteer experience than women and that these differential 
returns can explain a substantial part of the gender earnings gap. Thanks to our 
experimental setting, in which we alternate between female and male pairs, we are 
able to investigate whether there is also a higher premium of volunteering for males 
with respect to hiring chances. Second, our experimental design allows us to 
investigate the relative effect of different doses of volunteer work (i.e. one, two or 
three volunteering activities). More activity might yield a stronger signal of 
                                                     
1 One exception is the finding of a decrease in current earnings by 1.7% for volunteers in the subgroup of workers 
in the private sector in France (Prouteau and Wolff, 2006). 
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(beneficial qualities related to) volunteering and a stronger signal of an overly low 
focus on paid regular work (given the aforementioned time trade-off between both 
activities). 
2. The Experiment 
To measure the volunteering premium in employment opportunities, we built on the 
correspondence experimentation framework of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), 
which has been recently used and calibrated by Kroft et al. (2013), Eriksson and 
Rooth (2014), Patacchini et al. (2015) and Baert et al. (2016c), among others. Within 
this type of experiment, pairs of fictitious job applications are sent to real job 
openings. The fictitious applications only differ in the characteristic (the 
experimental “treatment”) that is to be tested. By monitoring subsequent call-back, 
unequal treatment based on this characteristic (“treatment effect”) can be identified 
and given a causal interpretation (Pager, 2007; Riach and Rich, 2002). 
We conducted our experiment between December 2014 and April 2015. During 
this period, we sent pairs of fictitious job applications to real vacancies in Flanders, 
the Northern part of Belgium,2 posted by commercial and non-commercial 
organisations. For each vacancy, we randomly assigned two identities with respect 
to volunteering (one control and one treated identity) to each member of the pairs 
of applicants. In addition to this within-pair randomisation of volunteering, to inspect 
heterogeneous treatment effects, the female or male gender (equal for both pair 
members) and different combinations of three types of volunteering (for the treated 
applicant within the pairs) were randomly assigned between the pairs of applicants. 
Thereafter, reactions from the employers were analysed to investigate the surplus3 
                                                     
2 Based on the ESS6 data mentioned in the introduction, the level of volunteering in Belgium is slightly above the 
average level across all respondents in Europe. More concretely, 27.0% of the surveyed Belgians in the ESS6 data 
reported having undertaken volunteer work during the previous six months (see Figure 1). 
3 Throughout this article, with the “surplus of volunteering”, we refer to job candidates’ higher probability of positive 
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from different types of volunteering for different types of individuals.  
2.1 Application Templates 
In contrast to many former correspondence experiments in which applications were 
sent to vacancies in only one or a few specific occupations (with, potentially, a high 
(or low) treatment effect) (Baert, 2017),4 we aimed to test the returns to 
volunteering with respect to hiring chances in multiple occupations (and, in relation 
to this, multiple sectors). Therefore, we created pairs of application templates 
(comprised of a résumé and a motivation letter) for jobseekers at two education 
levels. The middle-educated pair held a secondary education degree in commerce, 
and the high-educated pair held a bachelor’s degree in office management. These 
degrees, obtained from the same type of school, allowed them to apply for almost 
all commercial and administrative positions at the ISCED 3 and ISCED 5 levels,5 
respectively.  
The two templates within each pair (which we labelled type ‘A’ and type ‘B’ 
applications) were, at the education level, identical concerning all job-relevant 
characteristics but differed in wording, fonts and formatting to prevent the 
employers from detecting the experiment. To ensure that our templates were 
realistic, example résumés and motivation letters from the Public Employment 
                                                     
call-back due to volunteer work disclosed in their résumés. 
4 For instance, age discrimination is tested by Riach and Rich (2007) in the occupation of waiter only, by Albert et al. 
(2011) in the occupations of seller and waiter only and by Ahmed et al. (2012) in the occupation of clerk (in 
accountancy, administration or sales) only. 
5 ISCED stands for “International Standard Classification of Education”. ISCED 3 refers to upper-secondary education 
(i.e. more specialised education that typically begins at age 15 or 16 years preparing; it prepares pupils for tertiary 
education, provides them with skills relevant to employment, or does both). Examples of tested occupations at this 
level are: administrative clerk, call center employee, commercial clerk, demonstrator, executive clerk, 
representative, and (tele-)seller. ISCED 5 refers to the first stage of tertiary education (i.e. programmes with an 
educational content more advanced than those offered at ISCED level 3 and ISCED level 4 (post-secondary non-
tertiary education), which might be academically or practically oriented). Examples of tested occupations at this 
level are: (assistant) accountant, consultant in marketing and publicity, consultant in finance, consultant in 
recruitment and selection, customer declaration officer, and executive assistant human resources. 
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Agency of Flanders (“VDAB”) were used and refined. 
All fictitious applicants were single individuals born, living and studying in 
Antwerp, the largest city of Flanders, with approximately 503,000 inhabitants. The 
middle-educated individuals were 20 years old, and the high-educated were 23 years 
old. They graduated in June 2012. Between August 2012 and November 2014 (just 
before the start of our experiment), they were employed in an administrative 
position at the level of their educational degree. At the moment of application, all 
applicants were unemployed and actively looking for a new job. A reason for the 
termination of their first job was not provided in the applications. 
In addition, the following characteristics were added to all fictitious applicants: 
a Flemish name and surname;6 an address (existing street name but non-existing 
house number) in a middle income neighbourhood; an email address and a mobile 
phone number (from leading providers); a date of birth in 1994 (middle-educated) 
or 1991 (high-educated); a gender (see Section 2.2); a Belgian nationality; very good 
Dutch, French and English language skills; very good office software skills; a driver’s 
license; and the availability of a car. 
It is important to keep in mind that minimal differences between type A and type 
B application templates could not bias our results because the volunteering 
engagement as our treatment of interest was, for each vacancy, randomly assigned 
to these types, as discussed in the following subsection. 
2.2 Randomised Assignment of Treatment of Volunteering, Particular 
Combination of Volunteer Work and Gender 
Two job candidacies, one of type A and one of type B, were sent to each selected 
vacancy. Within these pairs of applicants, the mention of undertaken volunteer work 
was alternately assigned to either the type A template or the type B template. More 
specifically, volunteer work was mentioned in the résumés’ “Miscellaneous” section, 
                                                     
6 In parallel with this field experiment, an analogous experiment was conducted with Turkish names to investigate 
whether volunteering might reduce ethnic labour market discrimination (Baert and Vujić, 2016). 
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in which it is common in Flanders to refer to “extracurricular” memberships and 
engagements. Résumés that did not have volunteer work only reported their car 
ownership under the “Miscellaneous” section.7  
To measure the returns to volunteering for different types and different doses 
of volunteer work, we alternately assigned one out of seven combinations of 
volunteer activities to the treated applicant. These seven options were based on all 
possible combinations of one, two or three engagements out of three potential 
activities. The first activity that was mentioned by a part of the treated applicants 
was “volunteer work at Poverello [the major life-saving food provider in Belgium] 
(preparing and disseminating meals, once per week).” The second potential activity 
was “volunteer work at Stichting tegen Kanker [the major cancer foundation in 
Belgium] (fundraising and supporting local activities on a frequent basis).” The last 
one was “equipment manager at Korfbal Club Artemis [a regional korfball club in 
Antwerp] (logistic support at main trainings and game days).”8 Consequently, the 
seven possible combinations that were alternately revealed by the treated 
applicants were: (i) volunteer at life-saving food provider; (ii) volunteer at cancer 
foundation; (iii) volunteer at sports club; (iv) volunteer at life-saving food provider 
and cancer foundation; (v) volunteer at life-saving food provider and sports club; (vi) 
volunteer at cancer foundation and sports club, and (vii) volunteer at life-saving food 
provider, cancer foundation and sports club. 
Finally, to obtain heterogeneous volunteering effects by gender, we alternated 
between female and male pairs of fictitious candidates. The gender of the 
candidates was indicated in the résumé by means of their name and gender. Their 
(typically male or female) name was also mentioned in their motivation letter. 
                                                     
7 As mentioned earlier, 23.4% of all European and 27.0% of all Belgian respondents in the ESS6 reported that they 
were involved in volunteer work. When focussing only on the subpopulation of interest for our study, i.e. youth 
respondents, the corresponding percentage is 24.0% for the 15- to 24-year-olds both in Europe and Belgium. So, 
volunteer work is more or less as common for young people as for adults. 
8 This sports was chosen due to its high representation of both females and males. 
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2.3 Vacancy Selection, Application and Call-Back 
We sent to genuine vacancies the resulting combinations of two application 
templates, two experimental identities, seven combinations of different types and 
doses of volunteer work, and two genders. These two applications were sent with 
12 to 36 hours in between and in an alternating order. More concretely, between 
December 2014 and April 2015, we tested randomly selected vacancies in the 
database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders, the region’s major job 
search channel, for which our (middle- or high-educated) pairs of applicants had the 
right classifications. In total, we sent out 576 applications; half of them were with 
middle-educated applicants, and the other half were with high-educated applicants. 
Reactions from (real) employers to our fictitious candidacies were received by 
email and mobile phone voicemail. All reactions obtained later than 40 days after 
the date of candidacy submission were not considered. In our analysis, we will 
distinguish between two definitions of positive call-back. Positive call-back in a broad 
sense indicates that the applicant received (i) an invitation for an interview 
concerning the job for which she/he applied, (ii) a proposal of an alternative position, 
(iii) an inquiry to provide the employer with more information, or (iv) a general 
inquiry to contact the employer. Positive call-back in a strict sense indicates that the 
applicant was invited for an interview concerning the job for which she/he applied.9 
As we measure (and analyse) only these very first call-backs, our results discussed in 
the following section should not be equated to divergences in final job offers (let 
alone in wages or income). We return to this limitation in Section 4. 
                                                     
9 By presenting both outcomes, we pursue to be as complementary to the literature as possible. A substantial 
proportion of correspondence studies only provide statistics on positive call-back in a broad sense (Albert et al., 
2011; Jacquemet and Yannelis, 2012; Kaas and Manger, 2012; Patacchini et al., 2015) while another substantial 
proportion only focuses on interview rates (Ahmed et al., 2012; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Eriksson and 
Rooth, 2014; Kroft et al., 2013; Riach and Rich, 2007). Some recent contributions present both outcome measures, 
as we do (Baert et al., 2016a; Baert et al., 2016b; Lahey, 2008; Neumark et al., 2015). 
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3. The Results 
3.1 Bivariate Analysis 
Table 2 describes our data. We present positive call-back rates for the volunteering 
and non-volunteering candidate within the submitted pairs of fictitious job 
candidacies. In Panel A (Panel B) we list these outcomes for the broad-sense (strict-
sense) definitions of positive call-back, respectively.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
Call-back outcomes with respect to all tested vacancies together are presented 
in the first row of Panel A and Panel B. Overall, the volunteering candidates received 
a positive reaction in a broad sense (an invitation for a job interview) in 22.9% 
(11.1%) of applications, whereas their non-volunteering counterparts obtained a 
positive reaction (an invitation) in only 15.6% (8.3%) of cases.10 The positive call-back 
difference between these “treated” and control candidates is presented in column 
(5). The volunteering candidate within the pairs of fictitious candidates was 7.3 
percentage points more likely to receive any positive reaction and 2.8 percentage 
points more likely to being invited for a job interview.11 The former statistic is 
significantly different from 0 at the 1% significance level. The latter is significant only 
at the 10% significance level, related to the lower level of variation in positive call-
backs in a strict sense.  
Somewhat surprisingly, this overall level of the hiring premium for volunteers is 
only slightly smaller than the level of the premium of a native-sounding (versus a 
                                                     
10 Broken down by the four categories of positive call-back mentioned at the end of Section 2.3, the volunteering 
candidates got, besides an interview invitation in 11.1% of the cases (32 vacancies), a proposal of an alternative 
position in 1.4% of the cases (4 vacancies), an inquiry to provide the employer with more information in 3.5% of the 
cases (10 vacancies) and a general inquiry to contact the employer in 6.9% of the cases (20 vacancies). The control 
candidate got, besides an interview invitation in 8.3% of the cases (24 vacancies), a proposal of an alternative 
position in 0.3% of the cases (1 vacancy), an inquiry to provide the employer with more information in 2.4% of the 
cases (7 vacancies) and a general inquiry to contact the employer in 4.5% of the cases (13 vacancies). 
11 Stated otherwise, volunteers are 46.7% (≈ 0.229/0.156) more likely to get positive call-back in a broad sense and 
33.3% (≈ 0.111/0.083) more likely to get positive call-back in a strict sense compared to non-volunteers. 
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Turkish-sounding) name found within a comparable correspondence study in 
Flanders in 2011–2012 on ethnic discrimination (with a positive call-back difference 
of 8.0 and 5.8 percentage points with respect to getting any positive reaction and 
getting an invitation to a job interview, respectively; Baert et al., 2015). In addition, 
the surplus from volunteering is comparable to the surplus found for male applicants 
(compared to female applicants) when applying for positions implying a first 
promotion in a comparable experiment on Sticky Floors in the Flemish labour market 
in 2013–2014 (with a premium of 4.9 and 3.7 percentage points with respect to 
getting any positive reaction and getting an invitation to a job interview, 
respectively; Baert et al., 2016a). 
In the lower rows of Panel A and Panel B of Table 2, we break down the positive 
call-back differences by several characteristics of the pairs of fictitious candidates. 
More concretely, we break down the total sample by (i) the education level of the 
pair, (ii) the pair’s gender, (iii) the mention of a particular type of volunteer work by 
the treated pair member and (iv) her/his total number of volunteering activities 
mentioned. First, our overall finding of a surplus for volunteering at first hiring 
decisions is somewhat driven by the subsample of high-educated individuals. 
However, while the volunteering premium in both subsamples by this break down is 
(weakly) significant with respect to positive call-back in a broad sense, they are both 
insignificant with respect to positive call-back in a strict sense. Second, we find 
suggestive evidence for the volunteering premium to be higher for female than for 
male candidates. For female candidates, the mention of an engagement as a 
volunteer increases the probability of a positive reaction by 13.2 percentage points 
and the probability of a job interview invitation by 6.9 percentage points. For the 
subsample of male candidates, no unequal treatment based on volunteering is 
found. This higher call-back premium for women contrasts with the research findings 
of Day and Devlin (1997), Wilson et al. (2017) and Cozzi et al. (in press) mentioned 
in the introduction. We return to this observation in Section 4.12 Third, positive call-
                                                     
12 In addition, breaking down our data by the gender of the candidates indicates that Belgian employers prefer 
female workers in the tested occupations. This might be related to the fact that these occupations are female-
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back rates are somewhat higher for pairs in which the treated candidate revealed 
(solely or together with one or both of the two other volunteering activities) 
volunteering at the life-saving food provider or at the cancer foundation (compared 
to revealing volunteering at the korfball club). Fourth, the last rows in Panel A and 
Panel B do not provide evidence for a higher volunteering premium for volunteers 
with more volunteering activities.13 We will return to the significance of all these 
dimensions of heterogeneity in the premium of volunteering with respect to first 
hiring outcomes when we present our regression results in the next subsection. 
3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Because the volunteering and non-volunteering candidates were randomly assigned 
within our pairs of applications, regressing positive call-back on an indicator of being 
a volunteering candidate yields exactly the same empirical pattern as that based on 
the first row of Panel A and Panel B of Table 2. Moreover, because these variables 
were randomly assigned between pairs, regressions on interactions between 
volunteering and, among other candidate characteristics, the gender of the 
candidate and her/his particular volunteer work should lead to the same empirical 
pattern as the one in the lower rows of Panel A and Panel B of Table 2, at least when 
the sample size approaches infinity. However, the actual size of our sample is not 
infinite. Consequently, some of the variables randomly assigned between pairs may 
happen to correlate with vacancy characteristics such as the sector or the use of an 
interim office. Moreover, by construction, the type and dose of the mentioned 
volunteering are correlated with each other.14 To control for these sources of 
                                                     
dominated. Because typically female characteristics are perceived as particularly productive in traditionally female 
occupations, hiring outcomes are expected to be more in favour of women in these female-dominated occupations 
(Baert et al., 2016a; Booth and Leigh, 2010; Weichselbaumer, 2004). 
13 An important caveat in this respect is that we might have lacked statistical power to reject unequal treatment for 
the subsamples of vacancies in which the treated candidate revealed only one volunteering activity (96 vacancies) 
or three volunteering activities (48 vacancies). 
14 In case one (two; three) engagement(s) is (are) mentioned, the probability for each particular type to be included 
in the résumé is 33.3% (66.7%; 100.0%). 
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correlation, we further analyse the experimental data by a regression analysis. 
Table 3 presents our model estimates. We regress positive call-back in a broad 
sense (Model (1) to (4)) or a strict sense (Model (5) to (8)) on various sets of key and 
control variables, included as such (when not invariant for control applicants) and in 
interaction with disclosing an engagement as a volunteer. To ensure comparability 
of the average volunteering effect across regression models, all variables except for 
the one indicating volunteering individuals are normalised by subtracting their mean 
value among the subpopulation of candidates with volunteering activities. Lastly, 
because two applicants contacted the same firm, their probability of receiving a 
positive reaction is correlated. Therefore, standard errors are corrected for the 
clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
In Model (1) and (5), we regress positive call-back on a dummy indicating only 
volunteer work. In line with the first row of Panel A and Panel B of Table 2, we see 
that volunteering increases positive call-back in a broad sense with 7.3 percentage 
points and positive call-back in a strict sense with 2.8 percentage points.15  
In Model (2) and (6), we add interactions between volunteer work and the 
variables by which we broke down our data in the lower rows of Panel A and Panel 
B of Table 2. More concretely, we add interactions with indicators of high-educated 
candidates, male candidates, candidates who reveal engagement in a cancer 
organisation, candidates who reveal engagement at a korfball sports club, 
candidates with two engagements, and candidates with three engagements. For 
both call-back outcomes, we find a significant interaction only with respect to 
gender: the male volunteering premium in terms of getting any positive reaction (an 
                                                     
15 While the size of our sample is substantially lower than the size of the data gathered in some recent large-scale 
correspondence experiments in the United States such as Kroft et al. (2013) and Neumark et al. (2015), it is at least 
comparable to many other recent (and well-published) field experiments included in the review study of Baert 
(2017). In addition, a post hoc power analysis shows that based on the variation in our dataset, we were able to 
distinguish rather small effects from zero effects. For instance, an increase of the positive call-back rate in a broad 
sense with 4.7 (≈ 1.96 x 0.024 x 100) percentage points could have been rejected at the 5% significance level. 
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invitation to a job interview) is 11.8 (8.3) percentage points lower than the female 
premium. Again, this is perfectly in line with what is shown in Table 2.16 In addition, 
not surprisingly, we observe significantly higher positive call-back rates for the high-
educated candidates (without interaction with volunteering).  
In Model (3) and (7), we extend the set of variables included as such and in 
interaction with volunteering with two vacancy characteristics that may, due to the 
finite nature of our sample, correlate with the variables that were randomly assigned 
between the vacancies. These vacancy characteristics are (i) an indicator of 
vacancies in the public and non-profit sector17 and (ii) an indicator of vacancies 
posted by interim offices. Further, in Model (4) and (8), we add vacancy fixed effects 
to the specification of Model (3) and (7).18 The introduction of these additional 
controls hardly affects the aforementioned overall effect of disclosing volunteer 
work activities and the interaction effect with respect to gender.  
To further test the robustness of the presented regression results, we also 
estimated (i) binary logit models and (ii) and an ordered logit model.19 We also 
performed analyses with triple interactions between volunteering, education level 
and gender, but these analyses turned out to be underpowered to provide additional 
insights. The results for these models led to the same empirical conclusions and are 
                                                     
16 For instance, subtracting the male positive call-back difference of 1.4 percentage points from the female positive 
call-back difference of 13.2 shown in Panel A of Table 2, yields 11.8. 
17 Traditionally, the rate of volunteer participation has been found to be higher in the public and non-profit sector 
than in the private sector (Bandiera, 2014; Prouteau and Wolff, 2006; Rotolo and Wilson, 2006). It remains unclear 
whether this phenomenon is because prosocial employees are attracted to the societal goals of non-commercial 
organisations and, ipso facto, sort themselves into these organisations, or whether employers in the public and non-
profit sector are more likely than for-profit employers to rely on intrinsically (socially) motivated employees because 
of their unique organisational needs, with a strong desire for the generation of social benefits (Anderson et al., 2004; 
Bandiera et al., 2011; Baron and Hannan, 2002; Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008; Jacobsen et al., 2011; Kolstad and 
Lindkvist, 2013; Leete, 2000; Schneider, 1987). 
18 In these models, the variables without an interaction with volunteering are saturated (as they are constant at the 
vacancy level). 
19 The outcome variable of this model is 2 in cases in which the candidate is immediately invited to a job interview, 
1 in cases in which she/he receives any other (broad-sense) positive reaction, and 0 in cases in which she/he receives 
no positive reaction at all. 
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available upon request. 
4. Conclusion 
In this study, we contributed to the literature on the returns to volunteering in the 
labour market. Whereas all previous contributions to this literature relied on 
observational data to estimate the effect of volunteering on income, we adopted a 
field experimental approach to investigate its impact on hiring chances. More 
concretely, we sent pairs of fictitious job applications to genuine vacancies in 
Belgium. For every vacancy, a treatment of volunteering was randomly assigned to 
one pair member. By analysing employers’ call-back, we found that the causal effect 
of disclosing volunteering activities on hiring opportunities is, both in statistical and 
economic terms, substantial. Volunteering candidates were found to have a 7.3 
percentage points higher probability of receiving any positive reaction and a 2.8 
percentage points higher probability of being immediately invited for a job 
interview. So, our findings turned out to be fully consistent with the previous 
contributions to this literature, all of which provided evidence for a substantial 
positive effect of volunteer work on income. 
Because in addition to the within-pair randomisation of volunteering, the female 
or male gender and different combinations of three types of volunteering were 
randomly assigned between our pairs of fictitious job applicants, we were able to 
estimate heterogeneity in the volunteering premium by the gender of the candidate 
and her/his dose of volunteering. We found that women had larger returns to 
volunteer experience than men. This contrasts to what was found in contributions 
on the volunteering premium in income. An explanation for these diverging results 
might be that the higher volunteering premium for men found based on 
observational data may merely reflect the fact that males select themselves into 
types of volunteering that are more rewarded in the labour market (such as service 
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clubs).20  
We end by acknowledging three research limitations inherent to our study 
design. The most important limitation of this study is its focus on a particular—but 
determining—labour market outcome, i.e. the initial hiring decisions of employers 
(outside candidates’ network). Because we simply investigate effects on first call-
backs, we cannot translate our findings into divergences in final job offers (let alone 
in wages or income). However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) have argued that 
one can expect that reduced interview rates translate into reduced job offers as 
employers are expected to invite only job candidates with a fair chance of finally 
getting the job. 
A second limitation has further repercussions for the generalisability of our 
findings. We measure only the (potential) surplus of volunteering for young 
candidates within jobs in administrative and commercial occupations submitted to 
the Public Employment Agency of Flanders. Although compared to former 
correspondence experiments (see Section 2.1), this limitation is less acute in our 
design, it is still possible that the surplus of volunteering is more or less present in 
other occupations than those covered in our study. In particular, as we focus on 
white-collar jobs, our results cannot be easily generalised to blue-collar jobs. For 
instance, personality traits related to volunteering such as extraversion and 
openness might be more relevant in white-collar than in blue-collar jobs and, as a 
consequence, result in a lower volunteering premium in the latter jobs. However, 
because this limitation should cause a similar shift in the volunteering surplus 
irrespective of candidate characteristics, this fact should not bias the conclusions 
with respect to heterogeneity in the surplus of volunteering by, for instance, the 
gender of the candidate. The same is true for the first mentioned limitation. 
Third, our experimental setting does not allow us to disentangle the mechanisms 
                                                     
20 Day and Devlin (1997) and Dittrich and Mey (2015) show, indeed, that women in Canada and Germany spend 
more time performing volunteer work at religious organisations or organisations that help the poor or the elderly, 
whereas men are more active in recreational organisations and service clubs, such as the Rotary Club. Exploratory 
analyses by Day and Devlin (1997) indicate that the latter types of volunteering are more rewarded in the labour 
market. 
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underlying the volunteering premium. Because strict equivalence between our 
fictitious applicants was ensured and because, by construction, they applied for 
positions with an employer outside their network, the positive treatment effects can 
only be explained by employer side preferences and perceptions. However, these 
preferences and perceptions may relate to all three theoretical channels for a 
volunteering premium mentioned in the introduction. On the one hand, employers 
may have a taste for collaboration with prosocial employees and/or believe that 
their other employees’ or customers have a taste in this respect. On the other hand, 
they may derive human capital and/or social capital related characteristics from 
volunteering on one’s résumé.21 In our opinion, exploring the relative importance of 
these mechanisms is the logical next step to take in this literature. Also from a 
societal point of view it would be interesting to know why exactly volunteering does 
pay-off in the labour market as policy makers who want to stimulate volunteering in 
their society could use this information in motivating campaigns. 
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Figure 1. Fraction of Individuals at Work for Voluntary or Charitable 
Organisations At Least Once Every Six Months by Country in Europe (in 
2006/2007 and 2012/2013) 
 
Notes. Source: Own calculations based on the question “In the past 12 months, how often did you get involved in work 
for voluntary or charitable organisations?” in the third round (conducted in 2006/2007) and sixth round (conducted in 
2012/2013) of the European Social Survey. Only countries that were surveyed in both rounds are included. 
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Table 1. Micro-Economic Returns to Volunteering in the Labour Market: Literature Review  
Study 
Country of 
analysis 
Main result(s) Methodological approach 
Cozzi et al. (in 
press) 
United 
Kingdom 
A (past or current) volunteering activity increases current and future wages by 45.5% 
for men and 38.3% for women. OLS estimates yield substantially lower returns. 
IV modelling (using rainfall across area districts as an instrument for volunteer 
activity) and controlling for individual fixed effects on longitudinal family 
survey data. 
Day and Devlin 
(1997) 
Canada 
A (past or current) volunteering activity increases current and future wages by 21.5% 
for men and 11.2% for women. 
OLS regressions controlling for observables on cross-sectional survey data of 
volunteer activity. 
Day and Devlin 
(1998) 
Canada 
A (past or current) volunteering activity in the current year increases earnings in this 
year by 6.6%. 
OLS regressions controlling for observables on cross-sectional survey data of 
volunteer activity. 
Hackl et al. 
(2007) 
Austria A current volunteering activity increases current earnings by 18.5%. 
IV modelling (using engagement in a club during youth and having a 
volunteering partner as an instrument for volunteer activity) on cross-sectional 
family survey data. 
Prouteau and 
Wolff (2006) 
France 
A current volunteering activity (in which one performs managerial tasks) increases 
current earnings by 5.5% in the public sector and decreases current earnings by 1.7% 
in the private sector. 
Bivariate probit estimations with endogenous switching on cross-sectional 
family time allocation survey data. 
Sauer (2015) 
United 
States 
An extra year of (past or current) volunteering activity increases wage offers in future 
full-time (part-time) work by 2.6% (8.5%) for women between age 25 and 55. 
Structural modelling (discrete choice dynamic programming) on longitudinal 
family survey data.  
Wilson et al. 
(2017) 
United 
Kingdom 
A current volunteering activity increases current income by 6.2% for men and 4.1% 
for women. 
Individual fixed effects regressions on longitudinal family survey data. 
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Table 2. Positive Call-Back in a Broad Sense by Volunteer Status  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Data selection Jobs 
Positive call-back rate 
Positive call-back difference:  
(3) – (4) Volunteer  
candidate 
Control 
candidate 
A. Positive call-back in a broad sense 
All 288 0.229 0.156 0.073*** [3.043] 
Middle-educated 144 0.118 0.069 0.049* [1.961] 
High-educated 144 0.340 0.243 0.097** [2.371] 
Female gender 144 0.319 0.188 0.132*** [3.224] 
Male gender 144 0.139 0.125 0.014 [0.576] 
Volunteer at life-saving food provider 176 0.239 0.153 0.085*** [2.656] 
Volunteer at cancer foundation 176 0.233 0.142 0.091*** [3.097] 
Volunteer at sports club 176 0.233 0.188 0.045 [1.517] 
One volunteering activity 96 0.219 0.135 0.083* [1.912] 
Two volunteering activities 144 0.222 0.167 0.056* [1.717] 
Three volunteering activities 48 0.271 0.167 0.104* [1.699] 
B. Positive call-back in a strict sense 
Full sample 288 0.111 0.083 0.028* [1.711] 
Middle-educated 144 0.056 0.042 0.014 [1.000] 
High-educated 144 0.167 0.125 0.042 [1.419] 
Female gender 144 0.181 0.111 0.069** [2.396] 
Male gender 144 0.042 0.056 -0.014 [1.000] 
Volunteer at life-saving food provider 176 0.125 0.097 0.028 [1.294] 
Volunteer at cancer foundation 176 0.102 0.074 0.028 [1.390] 
Volunteer at sports club 176 0.108 0.091 0.017 [0.831] 
One volunteering activity 96 0.104 0.073 0.031 [1.136] 
Two volunteering activities 144 0.118 0.083 0.035 [1.514] 
Three volunteering activities 48 0.104 0.104 0.000 [0.000] 
Notes. The t-test for the positive call-back difference tests the null hypothesis that the positive call-back rates are the same for volunteer 
and control candidates. *** (**; *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%; 10%) significance level. T-values are bracketed. 
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Table 3. Regression Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Volunteering 
0.073*** 
(0.024) 
0.073*** 
(0.024) 
0.073*** 
(0.024) 
0.073*** 
(0.024) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
Volunteering x High-educated (normalised)  
0.049 
(0.048) 
0.038 
(0.049) 
0.039 
(0.049) 
 0.028 
(0.032) 
0.025 
(0.030) 
0.025 
(0.029) 
Volunteering x Male gender (normalised)  
-0.118** 
(0.048) 
-0.113** 
(0.048) 
-0.113** 
(0.047) 
 -0.083** 
(0.032) 
-0.082** 
(0.032) 
-0.082** 
(0.032) 
Volunteering x Volunteer at cancer foundation (normalised)  
-0.013 
(0.062) 
-0.007 
(0.062) 
0.018 
(0.060) 
 -0.050 
(0.051) 
-0.050 
(0.051) 
0.002 
(0.037) 
Volunteering x Volunteer at sports club (normalised)  
-0.013 
(0.063) 
-0.010 
(0.064) 
-0.086 
(0.065) 
 -0.038 
(0.047) 
-0.038 
(0.047) 
-0.025 
(0.045) 
Volunteering x Two volunteering activities (normalised)  
0.012 
(0.061) 
0.013 
(0.061) 
0.000 
(0.063) 
 0.043 
(0.047) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
0.013 
(0.044) 
Volunteering x Three volunteering activities (normalised)  
0.069 
(0.102) 
0.071 
(0.102) 
0.072 
(0.100) 
 0.058 
(0.073) 
0.058 
(0.074) 
-0.014 
(0.069) 
Volunteering x Public and non-profit sector (normalised)  
 -0.053 
(0.064) 
-0.055 
(0.062) 
  -0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
Volunteering x Interim office as posting agency (normalised)  
 0.073 
(0.102) 
0.073 
(0.101) 
  0.020 
(0.085) 
0.022 
(0.085) 
High-educated (normalised)  
0.174*** 
(0.042) 
0.172*** 
(0.044) 
  0.083** 
(0.032) 
0.086*** 
(0.033) 
 
Male gender (normalised)  
-0.063 
(0.042) 
-0.065 
(0.043) 
  -0.056* 
(0.032) 
-0.056* 
(0.034) 
 
Public and non-profit sector (normalised)  
 0.051 
(0.080) 
   0.001 
(0.053) 
 
Interim office as posting agency (normalised)  
 0.009 
(0.083) 
   -0.023 
(0.057) 
 
Intercept 
0.156*** 
(0.021) 
0.156*** 
(0.021) 
0.156*** 
(0.021) 
0.156*** 
(0.021) 
0.083*** 
(0.016) 
0.083*** 
(0.016) 
0.083*** 
(0.016) 
0.083*** 
(0.016) 
Vacancy fixed effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Outcome variable: Positive call-back in a broad sense Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Outcome variable: Positive call-back in a strict sense No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 576 
Notes. The presented statistics are coefficients and standard errors based on linear probability model estimates. All independent variables except for the volunteer indicator, are normalised by subtracting their mean 
value among the subpopulation of candidates with volunteering activities. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, are between parentheses. *** (**; *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%; 10%) 
significance level. 
